Faulty Communication: Some Variations on the Electronic Mail Game

Abstract The electronic mail game of Rubinstein (1989) showed that a lack of common knowledge generated by faulty communication can make coordinated action impossible. This paper shows how this conclusion is robust to having a more realistic timing structure of messages, more than two players who meet publicly but not as a plenary group, and may be robust to strategic decisions about whether to communicate.

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Year of publication:	2002
Authors:	Morris, Stephen E
Published in:	The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics. - De Gruyter, ISSN 1935-1704, ZDB-ID 2268339-2. - Vol. 1.2002, 1
Publisher:	De Gruyter
Subject:	common knowledge \| communication \| coordination

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Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	research-article
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.2202/1534-5963.1027 [DOI]
Source:	Other ZBW resources

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014588983