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Favor exchange in collusion: Empirical study of repeated procurement auctions in Japan

It is known that bid rigging in public-work auctions in Japan often takes the form of exchanging favors. In such a scheme, the winner is designated based on favors he has given to other ring members. By explicitly modeling "favor" as an explanatory variable, this paper analyzes data from the public-works auctions for consulting works in Naha, Japan, to confirm that such a collusion scheme is in operation.
Year of publication:
2009
Authors: Ishii, Rieko
Published in:
International Journal of Industrial Organization. - Elsevier, ISSN 0167-7187. - Vol. 27.2009, 2, p. 137-144
Publisher: Elsevier
Subject: Bid rigging Collusion Repeated auction
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Type of publication: Article
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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005500020
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