Feasible elimination procedures in social choice : an axiomatic characterization
Year of publication: |
March 2017
|
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Authors: | Peleg, Bezalel ; Peters, Hans J. M. |
Published in: |
Research in economics : an international review of economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier Science, ISSN 1090-9443, ZDB-ID 1379004-3. - Vol. 71.2017, 1, p. 43-50
|
Subject: | Feasible elimination procedure | Anonymity | Maskin monotonicity | Independent blocking | Axiomatization | Theorie | Theory | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function |
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