Federalism and accountability with distorted election choices
Year of publication: |
2009
|
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Authors: | Kessing, Sebastian G. |
Publisher: |
Munich : Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |
Subject: | Föderalismus | Zentralstaat | Wiederwahl | Vergleich | Abstimmungsparadoxon | Theorie | accountability | federalism | decentralization | retrospective voting | Condorcet Jury Theorem |
Series: | CESifo Working Paper ; 2789 |
---|---|
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 61074237X [GVK] hdl:10419/30473 [Handle] |
Classification: | H73 - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior |
Source: |
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Federalism and accountability with distorted election choices
Kessing, Sebastian G., (2009)
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Federalism and accountability with distorted election choices
Kessing, Sebastian, (2009)
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Federalism and accountability with distorted election choices
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