Fight or Flight? Defending Against Sequential Attacks in the Game of Siege
Year of publication: |
2010
|
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Authors: | Deck, Cary ; Sheremeta, Roman |
Institutions: | Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of Business and Economics |
Subject: | Colonel Blotto | conflict resolution | weakest-link | game of siege | multi-period resource allocation | experiments |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | 30 pages |
Classification: | C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances |
Source: |
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Deck, Cary, (2012)
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