Fighting corruption: To precommit or not?

We consider a differential game with a corrupt government and civil society as its players. We characterize open-loop and feedback Nash equilibria and find that, whereas it is in the best interest of the government not to commit to a repression policy, civil society is better off precommitting to fight corruption.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Ngendakuriyo, Fabien ; Zaccour, Georges
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 120.2013, 2, p. 149-154
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Corruption \| Differential games \| Commitments

Online Resource

Check full text access |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In libraries world-wide (WorldCat)

In German libraries (KVK)

subito order

I need help

More details

Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; H8 - Miscellaneous Issues
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010678804