Fighting Mobile Crime
Two countries set their enforcement non-cooperatively to deter native and foreign individuals from committing crime in their territory. Crime is mobile, ex ante (migration) and ex post (fleeing), and criminals hiding abroad after having com- mitted a crime in a country must be extradited back. When extradition is not too costly, countries overinvest in enforcement: insourcing foreign criminals is more costly than paying the extradition cost. When extradition is sufficiently costly, in- stead, a large enforcement may induce criminals to flee the country whose law they infringed. The fear of paying the extradition cost enables the countries coordinating on the efficient outcome.
Year of publication: |
2019
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Authors: | Crinò, Rosario ; Immordino, Giovanni ; Piccolo, Salvatore |
Publisher: |
Munich : Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |
Subject: | crime | enforcement | extradition | fleeing | migration |
Saved in:
freely available
Series: | CESifo Working Paper ; 7446 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 1046935127 [GVK] hdl:10419/198806 [Handle] RePec:ces:ceswps:_7446 [RePEc] |
Classification: | K14 - Criminal Law ; K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law |
Source: |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012018137