Financement et gouvernement des entreprises. Exceptions et convergences européennes

Dealing with five countries of the European Union (France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom), the comparative analysis seeks to determine whether a convergence process of corporate governance systems is observed within Europe. This question is closely linked to the ownership and control structures of firms, themselves depending on the macrofinancial structures of the different countries. Although financial liberalization reinforced the role of institutional investors, these generally small shareholders remain dominated by blockholders all over Europe. Anyway the pressure exerted by institutional investors is leading to promoting independent directors and dual structure of corporate governance. Such a process illustrates an hybridization phenomenon of existing European models more than a unilateral spreading of an hypothetical Anglo-Saxon model. The existing Anglo-Saxon model is indeed more characterized by passive institutional investors, a not very efficient market of corporate control and difficulties to appoint truly active independent directors. Classification JEL: G3