Financial Crises and Central Bank Independence
Although cooperation between central banks and treasuries is controversial, this paper contends that in a crisis it is inevitable and desirable. Six reasons for cooperation in a crisis are advanced. Disengagement in the aftermath and restoring central bank independence is tricky, however. The paper concludes with comments on what is necessary to maintain central bank credibility.
Year of publication: |
2013
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Authors: | Blinder, Alan S |
Published in: |
Business Economics. - Palgrave Macmillan, ISSN 0007-666X. - Vol. 48.2013, 3, p. 163-165
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Publisher: |
Palgrave Macmillan |
Saved in:
Online Resource
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