Financial Work Incentives for Disability Benefit Recipients: Lessons from a Randomised Field Experiment
Disability insurance (DI) beneficiaries lose part of their benefits if their earnings exceed certain thresholds ("cash-cliffs"). This implicit taxation is considered the prime reason for low DI outflow. We analyse a conditional cash program that incentivises work related reductions of disability benefits in Switzerland. 4,000 randomly selected DI recipients receive an offer to claim up to CHF 72,000 (USD 71,000) if they expand work hours and reduce benefits. Initial reactions to the program announcement, measured by call-back rates, are modest; individuals at cash-cliffs react more frequently. By the end of the field phase, the take-up rate amounts to only 0.5%.
Year of publication: |
2014
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Authors: | Bütler, Monika ; Deuchert, Eva ; Lechner, Michael ; Staubli, Stefan ; Thiemann, Petra |
Publisher: |
Bonn : Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |
Subject: | disability insurance | field experiment | financial incentive | return-to-work |
Saved in:
freely available
Series: | IZA Discussion Papers ; 8715 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 813170532 [GVK] hdl:10419/107489 [Handle] RePEc:iza:izadps:dp8715 [RePEc] |
Classification: | H55 - Social Security and Public Pensions ; J14 - Economics of the Elderly ; C93 - Field Experiments ; d04 |
Source: |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010481596