Financing and product market competition: Optimal contracts with venture capitalists
Year of publication: |
2000
|
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Authors: | Neff, Cornelia |
Institutions: | Wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Fakultät, Eberhard-Karls-Universität Tübingen |
Subject: | Venture Capital | Dynamic Financial Contract | Moral Hazard and Learning | Innovation and Market Entry | Strategic Competition |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | German |
Notes: | Number 162 |
Classification: | G32 - Financing Policy; Capital and Ownership Structure ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; O31 - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives |
Source: |
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Financing and product market competition: Optimal contracts with venture capitalists
Neff, Cornelia, (2000)
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Beacham, Matthew, (2013)
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