Financing breakthroughs under failure risk
Year of publication: |
2022
|
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Authors: | Mayer, Simon |
Published in: |
Journal of financial economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0304-405X, ZDB-ID 187118-3. - Vol. 144.2022, 3, p. 807-848
|
Subject: | Adverse selection | Agency conflicts | Dynamic contracting | Innovation | Venture capital | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Risikokapital | Adverse Selektion | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard |
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