Finite order implications of common priors in infinite models
Year of publication: |
2010
|
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Authors: | Lipman, Barton L. |
Published in: |
Journal of mathematical economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0304-4068, ZDB-ID 217625-7. - Vol. 46.2010, 1 (20.1.), p. 56-70
|
Subject: | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information | Erwartungsbildung | Expectation formation | Theorie | Theory |
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