Firing tax vs. severance payment: An unequal comparison
Year of publication: |
2010
|
---|---|
Authors: | Wesselbaum, Dennis |
Publisher: |
Kiel : Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) |
Subject: | Kündigung | Kosten | Abfindung | Arbeitnehmerschutz | Wohlfahrtseffekt | Arbeitsmarktflexibilisierung | Theorie | Firing Costs | Severance Payments | Welfare |
Series: | Kiel Working Paper ; 1644 |
---|---|
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 633714038 [GVK] hdl:10419/39655 [Handle] RePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:1644 [RePEc] |
Classification: | D61 - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis ; E24 - Employment; Unemployment; Wages ; E32 - Business Fluctuations; Cycles |
Source: |
-
Firing tax vs. severance payment : an unequal comparison
Wesselbaum, Dennis, (2010)
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Who pays for it?: the heterogeneous wage effects of employment protection legislation
Leonardi, Marco, (2010)
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