Firms’ rationales for CEO duality: Evidence from a mandatory disclosure regulation

Exploiting the 2009 amendments to Regulation S-K, we provide unique evidence on the first-time disclosure of the reasons firms state for combining (separating) the roles of CEO and chairman. The stated reasons support both agency theory and organization theory. They are more numerous and comprise more words, including more positive words, for firms with duality. Examining the announcement returns to firms' disclosures, we find that investors evaluate the most frequently cited reasons for CEO duality by considering the firm's characteristics.

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Year of publication:	2019
Authors:	Goergen, Marc ; Limbach, Peter ; Scholz-Daneshgari, Meik
Publisher:	Cologne : University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR)
Subject:	CEO Duality \| Board of Directors \| Corporate Governance \| Regulation S-K \| Textual Analysis

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Series:	CFR Working Paper ; 18-06
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	1809642965 [GVK] hdl:10419/261100 [Handle] RePEc:zbw:cfrwps:1806 [RePEc]
Classification:	G14 - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies ; G34 - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance ; G38 - Government Policy and Regulation
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013270675