First-Mover Advantage Reversals Under Passive Cross Forward Ownership in Vertically Related Markets

We consider a two-tier industry with an upstream monopolist trading, via interim observable linear tariff contracts, with two differentiated goods downstream of Stackelberg competitors. The upstream monopolist owns a symmetric minority share on both downstream customers, i.e., there is passive cross-forward ownership (PCFO). We show that PCFO may reverse the well-known first-mover advantage of the Stackelberg game. PCFO is also pro-competitive and welfare enhancing

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Year of publication:	2022
Authors:	Petrakis, Emmanuel ; Skartados, Panagiotis
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Theorie \| Theory \| Vertikale Integration \| Vertical integration \| Duopol \| Duopoly \| Markteintritt \| Market entry \| Eigentümerstruktur \| Ownership structure

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (10 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments August 1, 2022 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.4179297 [DOI]
Classification:	D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; L14 - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014079387