First-price auctions with general information structures : implications for bidding and revenue
Year of publication: |
January 2017
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Authors: | Bergemann, Dirk ; Brooks, Ben ; Morris, Stephen |
Published in: |
Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an internat. society for the advancement of economic theory in its relation to statistics and mathematics. - [Wechselnde Erscheinungsorte] : [Wechselnde Verlage], ISSN 0012-9682, ZDB-ID 1798-X. - Vol. 85.2017, 1, p. 107-143
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Subject: | First-price auction | information structure | Bayes correlated equilibrium | private values | interdependent values | common values | revenue | surplus | welfare bounds | reserve price | Auktion | Auction | Information | Einnahmen | Revenue | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Theorie | Theory |
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