Fiscal conservatism in a new democracy: "Sophisticated" versus "naïve" voters
We use data from gubernatorial elections in Brazil to test the electoral reactions of "sophisticated" and "naïve" voters to fiscal surpluses. Our results complement Brender and Drazen [Brender, Adi, and Drazen, A., (2005b), "How do budget deficits and economic growth affect reelection prospects? Evidence from a large cross-section of countries", NBER Working Paper 11862, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts]: we find no evidence of fiscal illusion while, in some cases, a fiscal surplus may actually increase the probability of reelection.
Year of publication: |
2009
|
---|---|
Authors: | Arvate, Paulo Roberto ; Avelino, George ; Tavares, José |
Published in: |
Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 102.2009, 2, p. 125-127
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Budget deficits Elections Political cycles Fiscal conservatism |
Saved in:
Online Resource
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Fiscal conservatism in a new democracy : 'sophisticated' versus 'naive' votes
Arvate, Paulo Roberto, (2008)
-
Fiscal conservatism in a new democracy : "sophisticated" versus "nai͏̈ve" voters
Arvate, Paulo Roberto, (2009)
-
Fiscal conservatism in a new democracy: “Sophisticated” versus “naïve” voters
Arvate, Paulo Roberto, (2009)
- More ...