Fiscal leadership and central bank design
Year of publication: |
2007
|
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Authors: | Hughes Hallett, Andrew ; Weymark, Diana N. |
Published in: |
The Canadian journal of economics. - Boston, MA. : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 0008-4085, ZDB-ID 218117-4. - Vol. 40.2007, 2, p. 607-627
|
Subject: | Geldpolitik | Monetary policy | Finanzpolitik | Fiscal policy | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Zeit | Time | Globalsteuerung | Keynesian demand management | Umverteilung | Redistribution | Theorie | Theory |
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