Fixed-prize tournaments versus first-price auctions in innovation contests

Anja Schöttner

This paper analyzes a procurement setting with two identical firms and stochastic innovations. In contrast to the previous literature, I show that a procurer who cannot charge entry fees may prefer a fixed-prize tournament to a first-price auction since holding an auction may leave higher rents to firms when the innovation technology is subject to large random factors. -- innovation contest ; auction ; tournament ; quality

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Year of publication:	09 Aug. 2005
Other Persons:	Schöttner, Anja (contributor)
Publisher:	Berlin : SFB 649, Economic Risk
Subject:	Auktionstheorie \| Auction theory \| Innovationswettbewerb \| Technology competition

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Extent:	Online-Ressource, 18 S., Text
Series:	SFB 649 discussion paper. - Berlin : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 1860-5664, ZDB-ID 2195055-6. - Vol. 2005,041
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat reader
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/25050 [Handle]
Classification:	D44 - Auctions ; H57 - Procurement ; L15 - Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003147620