Fixed versus variable supply in the public provision of goods

Raluca Elena Buia

Using discriminatory price auctions with variable supply, we explore a situation in which a corruptible public employee is in charge of producing and allocating a finite number of goods among consumers with uniformly distributed valuations. The negative effects of corruption are lower when the employee‘s task is to “provide at least q0 goods” than when the employee is required to “provide exactly q0 goods”.

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Year of publication:	2009
Authors:	Buia, Raluca Elena
Published in:	Research in economics : an international review of economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier Science, ISSN 1090-9443, ZDB-ID 1379004-3. - Vol. 63.2009, 3, p. 160-164
Subject:	Öffentliche Dienstleistung \| Public services \| Korruption \| Corruption \| Theorie \| Theory

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Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal
Language:	English
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

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