Florida (Un)Chained

To understand a price boom, it is helpful to take account of: (1) observable indicators of changes in ex ante risk tolerance, (2) what information exists and when, and (3) the incentives lenders face. This paper takes such an approach to the Florida land boom of the mid-1920s, the U.S.' first housing boom in which buyers from around the nation participated. Estimates suggest that an astounding 20 million lots were offered for sale in Florida at that time. Our detailed narrative and empirical evidence suggest that the facts do not require the assumption of irrational behavior, but rather can be explained with all actors behaving with "bounded rationality." We find that most Florida banks that failed were associated with the Manley-Anthony chain and did not exhibit increases in observable indicators of risk during the boom. Instead, their increases in risk mainly reflected hidden choices either to lend to bank insiders on a preferential basis or to fund other banks that were engaged in such risky and often fraudulent activities. Given bank regulators seem complicit in the risk-taking, even informed investors would have been left in the dark as to the amount of risk that was growing Florida