Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring

We show that the folk theorem with individually rational payoffs defined by pure strategies generically holds for a general N-player repeated game with private monitoring when the number of each player's signals is sufficiently large. No cheap talk communication device or public randomization device is necessary

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Sugaya, Takuo
Publisher:	[2013]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Wiederholte Spiele \| Repeated games \| Folk-Theorem \| Folk theorem \| Theorie \| Theory

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (177 p)
Series:	Economic Theory Center Working Paper ; No. 011-2011
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments February 24, 2011 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.1789775 [DOI]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013093673