Folk theorems with bounded recall under (almost) perfect monitoring
We prove the perfect-monitoring folk theorem continues to hold when attention is restricted to strategies with bounded recall and the equilibrium is essentially required to be strict. As a consequence, the perfect monitoring folk theorem is shown to be behaviorally robust under almost-perfect almost-public monitoring. That is, the same specification of behavior continues to be an equilibrium when the monitoring is perturbed from perfect to highly-correlated private.
Year of publication: |
2011
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Authors: | Mailath, George J. ; Olszewski, Wojciech |
Published in: |
Games and Economic Behavior. - Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256. - Vol. 71.2011, 1, p. 174-192
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Repeated games Bounded recall strategies Folk theorem Imperfect monitoring |
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