Foreign Aid in the Presence of Corruption: Differential Games among Donors
We consider two dynamic games of foreign aid. <link rid="ss3">Model 1</link> deals with the case where donor countries continually feel the warm glow from the act of giving. <link rid="ss32">Model 2</link> postulates that donors will stop giving aid when a target level of development is reached. In <link rid="ss3">Model 1</link>, there are multiple equilibria that can be Pareto ranked. In <link rid="ss32">Model 2</link>, the equilibrium strategies are nonlinear functions of the level of development. The flow of aid falls at a faster and faster rate as the target is approached. An increase in corruption will increase the flow of aid. Copyright 2009 The Authors. Journal compilation 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Year of publication: |
2009
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Authors: | Kemp, Murray C. ; Long, Ngo Van |
Published in: |
Review of International Economics. - Wiley Blackwell, ISSN 0965-7576. - Vol. 17.2009, SI, p. 230-243
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Publisher: |
Wiley Blackwell |
Saved in:
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