Formal contracts, relational contracts, and the threat-point effect
Year of publication: |
2015
|
---|---|
Authors: | Itō, Hideshi ; Morita, Hodaka |
Published in: |
American economic journal : a journal of the American Economic Association. - Nashville, Tenn. : AEA, ISSN 1945-7669, ZDB-ID 2442378-6. - Vol. 7.2015, 3, p. 318-346
|
Subject: | Unvollständiger Vertrag | Incomplete contract | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Sunk Costs | Sunk costs | Wiederholte Spiele | Repeated games | Theorie | Theory |
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