Formal utilitarianism and range voting
In formal utilitarian voting, each voter assigns a numerical value to each alternative, and society chooses the alternative with the highest total value. Range voting is similar, except that each voter’s values are constrained to lie in the interval [0,1]. We characterize these rules via the axioms of anonymity, neutrality, reinforcement, overwhelming majority, and two novel conditions: maximal expressiveness, and an absence of “minority overrides”.
Year of publication: |
2014
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Authors: | Pivato, Marcus |
Published in: |
Mathematical Social Sciences. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-4896. - Vol. 67.2014, C, p. 50-56
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Saved in:
Online Resource
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