Fortress Building in Global Tax Competition.

This paper studies whether a group of countries can gain from harmonizing their capital income taxes if the rest of the world does not follow suit. It is shown that cooperation among the subgroup of countries is beneficial if tax rates in the initial fully non-cooperative Nash equilibrium are strategic complements. In this case tax harmonization among a subset of countries is Pareto improving for all countries.

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Year of publication:	1998
Authors:	Konrad, K.A. ; Schjelderup, G.
Institutions:	Norges Handelshøyskole (NHH)
Subject:	TAXATION \| INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY \| INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

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Series:	Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration-.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	15 pages
Classification:	F42 - International Policy Coordination and Transmission ; H20 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue. General ; H21 - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005672032