Forward induction reasoning and correct beliefs
Year of publication: |
May 2017
|
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Authors: | Perea, Andrés |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 169.2017, p. 489-516
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Subject: | Epistemic game theory | Dynamic games | Forward induction | Common strong belief in rationality | Correct beliefs assumption | Equilibrium | Rationalität | Rationality | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Dynamisches Spiel | Dynamic game |
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