Framing contracts : why loss framing increases effort
Year of publication: |
2012
|
---|---|
Authors: | Brooks, Richard R. W. ; Stremitzer, Alexander ; Tontrup, Stephan |
Published in: |
Journal of institutional and theoretical economics : JITE. - Tübingen : Mohr Siebeck, ISSN 0932-4569, ZDB-ID 232799-5. - Vol. 168.2012, 1, p. 62-82
|
Subject: | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Anreiz | Incentives | Verhaltensökonomik | Behavioral economics | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory |
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