FRAND royalties and injunctions for standard essential patents

Jay Pil Choi

I develop a stylized model of court procedures that resolve disputes concerning FRAND-encumbered standard essential patents (SEPs). I analyze the effects of injunctions and potential court-imposed FRAND rates on negotiated royalty rates. The SEP-holders' ability to hold-up is constrained by the prospect of the court-imposed license terms in case of disputes, but is not completely eliminated. Possible mechanisms to address the residual hold-up power of the SEP-holders are discussed.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Choi, Jay Pil
Publisher:	München : CESifo
Subject:	standard essential patents \| FRAND \| injunctions \| hold-up \| patent litigation \| Patent \| Patentrecht \| Patent law \| Theorie \| Theory \| Immaterialgüterrechte \| Intellectual property rights \| Standardisierung \| Standardization \| Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz \| Industrial property rights \| Innovation

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Extent:	Online-Ressource ([1], 24 S.) graph. Darst.
Series:	CESifo working papers. - München : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 2364-1428, ZDB-ID 2065232-X. - Vol. 5012
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/103137 [Handle]
Classification:	M21 - Business Economics ; L71 - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Hydrocarbon Fuels ; F21 - International Investment; Long-Term Capital Movements ; E32 - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

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