Fraudulence and the competitive supply of public goods

Alfred Endres

H. Demsetz claimed that under certain conditions private firms can supply public goods efficiently. Recently, it was argued that the optimality of the Demsetz equilibrium is destroyed when consumers engage in fraudulent behavior. In this paper, fraudulence is explicitly introduced in the Demsetz model. It ig shown that fraudulent consumers do no härm to the optimality of supplying public goods privately, within the framework of the Demsetz model.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	1978
Authors:	Endres, Alfred
Publisher:	Konstanz : Fachbereich Wirtschaftswiss. u. Statistik, Univ.

freely available

Full text |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

Extent:	8 S. graph. Darst. 30 cm
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	German
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/92527 [Handle]
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009574319