Frequent Acquirers and Management Compensation
Year of publication: |
2020
|
---|---|
Authors: | Mishra, Chandra S |
Publisher: |
[2020]: [S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Führungskräfte | Managers | Übernahme | Takeover | Theorie | Theory | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (63 p) |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments October 21, 2019 erstellt |
Other identifiers: | 10.2139/ssrn.3508081 [DOI] |
Classification: | G34 - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance ; M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects (stock options, fringe benefits, incentives, family support programs) ; M21 - Business Economics |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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