Frequent manipulability of elections : the case of two voters
Year of publication: |
2008
|
---|---|
Authors: | Dobzinski, Shahar ; Procaccia, Ariel D. |
Published in: |
Internet and network economics : 4th international workshop, WINE 2008, Shanghai, China, December 17-20, 2008 ; proceedings. - Berlin : Springer, ISBN 3-540-92184-2. - 2008, p. 653-664
|
Subject: | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Wahl | Election | Manipulation | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Pareto-Optimum | Pareto efficiency | Theorie | Theory |
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