Frequent Voter Recontracting: On Constitutional Choice and Minority Group Power
The Buchanan and Tullock Constitutional Choice model is examined. It is shown that it is important to distinguish between the concepts of negative and positive voter power and between cases in whichfrequent voter recontracting is and is not possible or likely to occur. Allowing for frequent voter recontracting it is further shown that positive voter power—the power to take action on behalf of the group rather than simply to prevent action from being taken— must lie, in any meaningful sense, with a majority coalition.
Year of publication: |
1981
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Authors: | Barnett, Richard R. |
Published in: |
Public Finance Review. - Vol. 9.1981, 3, p. 309-319
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