Friends or foes? : optimal incentives for reciprocal agents
Year of publication: |
2019
|
---|---|
Authors: | Livio, Luca ; De Chiara, Alessandro |
Published in: |
Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0167-2681, ZDB-ID 864321-0. - Vol. 167.2019, p. 245-278
|
Subject: | Gift exchange | Group production | Incentives | Moral hazard | Reciprocity | Team | Tournament | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Arbeitsgruppe | Moral Hazard | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Austauschtheorie | Social exchange theory | Anreiz | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Leistungsmotivation | Work motivation | Experiment |
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