From Polygamy to Serial Monogamy: a Unified Theory of Marriage Institutions
We consider an economy populated by males and females, both rich and poor. The society has to choose one of the following marriage institutions: polygamy, strict monogamy, and serial monogamy (divorce and remarriage). Preferences are aggregated through a voting process. After having identified the conditions under which each of these equilibria exists, we show that a rise in the share of rich males can explain a change of regime from polygamy to monogamy. The introduction of serial monogamy follows from a further rise in either the share of rich males, or from an increase in the proportion of rich females. Strict monogamy is a prerequisite to serial monogamy, as it promotes more than polygamy the upward social mobility of females. These results also show that polygamy is compatible with democracy.
Year of publication: |
2012
|
---|---|
Authors: | Croix, David de la |
Institutions: | Society for Economic Dynamics - SED |
Saved in:
freely available
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Population Policy through Tradable Procreation Rights
Croix, David de la, (2006)
-
To segregate or to integrate: education politics and democracy
Doepke, Matthias, (2004)
-
Early Literacy Achievements, Population Density and the Transition to Modern Growth
Boucekkine, Raouf, (2004)
- More ...