From sovereign default to a delayed correction:Argentine monetary policy observations

The sovereign debt restructuring before 2008 was considered as an infrequent economic sequel based on the assumption that a „sovereign borrower couldn't become bankrupt”. In Argentina, on the other hand, the repeating waves of populism, misconducted economic governance of the 1990's and the late '90-ies crises of the emerging economies lead to the biggest default ever. In the first half of the 2000's Argentina surmounted quickly the recession and the economy stepped on the way of a stable growth; necessitated deep reforms, however, were set aside. Under our hypothesis the nowadays Argentine monetary policy is determined by a delayed correction. We draw the lesson of the post-2001 default swap and on the role of the IMF. The apropo of the paper is provided by the peso course leap seen at the turning of 2013 and 2014. We scrutinise if the default could still have impact on these sequels or these are purely induced by the international financial actions. Our examinations seem to prove the latter.