From the Lab to the Field: Cooperation among Fishermen
We conduct a field experiment to measure cooperation among groups of recreational fishermen at a privately owned fishing facility. Group earnings are greater when group members catch fewer fish. Consistent with classical economic theory, though in contrast to prior results from laboratory experiments, we find no cooperation. A series of additional treatments identifies causes of the difference. We rule out the subject pool and the laboratory setting as potential causes and identify the type of activity involved as the source of the lack of cooperation in our field experiment. When cooperation requires reducing fishing effort, individuals are not cooperative.
Year of publication: |
2012
|
---|---|
Authors: | Stoop, Jan ; Noussair, Charles N. ; Soest, Daan van |
Published in: |
Journal of Political Economy. - University of Chicago Press. - Vol. 120.2012, 6, p. 1027-1027
|
Publisher: |
University of Chicago Press |
Saved in:
Online Resource
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Punishment, reward, and cooperation in a framed field experiment
Noussair, Charles, (2015)
-
From the lab to field : cooperation among fishermen
Stoop, Jan, (2012)
-
Cooperation in a dynamic fishing game : a framed field experiment
Noussair, Charles, (2015)
- More ...