FTAA, Brazil and United States : Why the Negotiations in Agriculture Came to a Deadlock

In December 1994, in Miami (the United States), Heads of democratic States of the Americas met to formalize the will of constructing a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). Between the FTAA issues to be negotiated, agriculture was particularly relevant to two main states: Brazil and United States. This study aims to propose an explanation of why the FTAA negotiation in agriculture came to a deadlock. Game Theory was used to formalize the explanation, setting the scenario as one arena of two players (Brazil and United States) and identifying both players’ i) interests and ii) strategies. Then, the Deadlock and Nested Games were applied to demonstrate how the relationship between both players’ interests and strategies carried the process through the deadlock. This explanatory study gathered data in books, scientific articles, official documents and seminars. The main conclusion is that a conflict of interests in market access, export subsidies and other measures with similar effects were the stimulus to non-cooperation between the players, because that move brought the optimal payoff to both the players, so that the negotiation in agriculture came to a deadlock