Fueling state capitalism : how domestic politics shapes foreign investments of national oil companies

Foreign investments by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the oil and gas sector began a dramatic climb in the late 1990s amid rising oil prices. These investments are widely perceived to be politically driven, raising concerns about resource mercantilism and asymmetric interdependence. The book begins with the premise that the investments are commercial ventures by ambitious SOEs seeking to become global players. Applying the principal agent model, the book argues that the realization of their global ambitions depends on two domestic structural factors. First, democracies can limit investments with questionable viability, as it can be politically costly for elected leaders to endorse SOE decisions that prove unprofitable for the state. Second, bureaucratic structures overseeing the SOEs can help prevent counterproductive behavior, conditional upon a clear line of authority among bureaucratic principals on matters pertaining to SOE operations. The argument differs from previous approaches by exploring a range of institutional alternatives to privatization for solutions to problems of oil sector governance.