Fulfilled Expectations Cournot Duopoly with Information Acquisition and Release

This article studies the fulfilled expectations equilibrium for a Cournot duopoly model in which firms acquire information about uncertain linear demand. Several propositions are established concerning the incentives to acquire and release information in this duopoly environment.

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Year of publication:	1982
Authors:	Novshek, William ; Sonnenschein, Hugo
Published in:	Bell Journal of Economics. - The RAND Corporation, ISSN 0361-915X. - Vol. 13.1982, 1, p. 214-218
Publisher:	The RAND Corporation

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005353581