Full revelation of information in Sender-Receiver games of persuasion
Year of publication: |
2008
|
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Authors: | Mathis, Jérôme |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 143.2008, 1, p. 571-584
|
Subject: | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Gleichgewichtsmodell | Equilibrium model | Theorie | Theory |
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