Game-Playing Agents: Unobservable Contracts as Precommitments
Year of publication: |
1991-07-01
|
---|---|
Authors: | Katz, Michael L. |
Institutions: | Institute of Business and Economic Research (IBER), Walter A. Haas School of Business |
Subject: | agency | precommitment | renegotiation | Social and Behavioral Sciences |
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