Game theoretic choices between corrupt dictatorship exit emoluments and nation-building CDR benefits : is there a Nash equilibrium?
Year of publication: |
2020
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Authors: | Ridley, Dennis ; Silva, Aryanne de |
Published in: |
The American economist : journal of the International Honor Society in Economics, Omicron Delta Epsilon. - London : Sage Publishing, ISSN 2328-1235, ZDB-ID 2068414-9. - Vol. 65.2020, 1, p. 51-77
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Subject: | political economy | entrepreneurship | capitalist | capitalism | democracy | rule of law | Kapitalismus | Capitalism | Korruption | Corruption | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Demokratie | Democracy | Diktatur | Dictatorship | Entrepreneurship | Entrepreneurship approach | Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie | Economic theory of democracy | Welt | World |
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