Game theory

Michael Maschler, Eilon Solan, Shmuel Zamir ; translated from Hebrew by Ziv Hellman ; english editor Mike Borns

Covering both noncooperative and cooperative games, this comprehensive introduction to game theory also includes some advanced chapters on auctions, games with incomplete information, games with vector payoffs, stable matchings and the bargaining set. Mathematically oriented, the book presents every theorem alongside a proof. The material is presented clearly and every concept is illustrated with concrete examples from a broad range of disciplines. With numerous exercises the book is a thorough and extensive guide to game theory from undergraduate through graduate courses in economics, mathematics, computer science, engineering and life sciences to being an authoritative reference for researchers.

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Alternative title:	Torat ha-mishakim
Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Mashler, Mikhaʾel ; Solan, Eilon ; Zamir, Shemuʾel
Other Persons:	Hellman, Ziv (translator) ; Borns, Mike (ed.)
Publisher:	Cambridge : Cambridge Universtiy Press
Subject:	Spieltheorie \| Game theory
Description of contents:	Table of Contents [swbplus.bsz-bw.de] ; Description [assets.cambridge.org] ; Description [zbmath.org] ; Description [assets.cambridge.org]

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Extent:	XXVI, 979 Seiten Diagramme
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Lehrbuch ; Textbook
Language:	English
Notes:	+++Achtung+++Hier auch später erschienene, unveränderte Nachdrucke! Literaturverzeichnis: Seiten 958-967 Machine generated contents note: Introduction; 1. The game of chess; 2. Utility theory; 3. Extensive-form games; 4. Strategic-form games; 5. Mixed strategies; 6. Behavior strategies and Kuhn's theorem; 7. Equilibrium refinements; 8. Correlated equilibria; 9. Games with incomplete information and common priors; 10. Games with incomplete information: the general model; 11. The universal belief space; 12. Auctions; 13. Repeated games; 14. Repeated games with vector payoffs; 15. Bargaining games; 16. Coalitional games with transferable utility; 17. The core; 18. The Shapley value; 19. The bargaining set; 20. The nucleolus; 21. Social choice; 22. Stable matching; 23. Appendices; Index.
ISBN:	1-107-00548-5 ; 978-1-107-00548-8
Classification:	Angewandte Mathematik
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013546766