Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism with general priority structures
Year of publication: |
2008
|
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Authors: | Kojima, Fuhito |
Published in: |
Social choice and welfare. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0176-1714, ZDB-ID 855101-7. - Vol. 31.2008, 3, p. 357-365
|
Subject: | Schulauswahl | School choice | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Theorie | Theory |
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