Games of social interactions with local and global externalities

In this paper we present a result on the existence of pure strategies Nash equilibrium which covers a large class of games with local and global social interactions. The result highlights common features of well-known games analyzed in the literature.

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Le Breton, Michel ; Weber, Shlomo
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 111.2011, 1, p. 88-90
Publisher:	Elsevier
Keywords:	Social interactions Conformity Externalities Potential function

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008866890