Games with imperfectly observable commitment
Year of publication: |
1997
|
---|---|
Authors: | Damme, Eric E. C. van |
Other Persons: | Hurkens, Sjaak (contributor) |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 21.1997, 1, p. 282-308
|
Subject: | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Theorie | Theory |
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