Gathering imperfect information before signing a contract
Year of publication: |
May 2016
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Authors: | Terstiege, Stefan |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 97.2016, p. 70-87
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Subject: | Principal agent | Information acquisition | Rent seeking | Sequential screening | Theorie | Theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Informationsversorgung | Information provision | Rent-Seeking | Vertrag | Contract | Signalling |
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